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RETHOUGHT FORMS: HOW DO THEY WORK?
necİP Fİkrİ AlİcAn
Abstract
This paper is a critical evaluation of Holger Thesleff's thinking on Plato's Forms, 
especially of his 'rethinking' of the matter, as he puts it in the title of his most 
recent contribution.1 It lays out a broadly sympathetic perspective through dia-
lectical engagement with the main lines of his interpretation and reconstruction 
of Plato's world. The aim is to launch the formal academic reception of that re-
construction (rethinking), which Thesleff cautiously and modestly presents as a 
'proposal' — his teaser to elicit a reaction, positive or negative. The exegetical 
focus is on tracing the inspiration and reasoning behind his 'two-level' model of 
Plato's ontology, which, in turn, supports his tripartite classification of Forms. 
The critical focus is on identifying potential areas of misunderstanding and sup-
plying any explanations, analyses, or arguments that may enhance the clarity of 
the respective positions.
1. Introduction
Thesleff is difficult to ignore and easy to misunderstand. He has something to say 
about practically everything we are accustomed to discussing in regard to Plato 
and a few things we are not. He also has a proclivity for going against the grain 
1  The 'rethinking' in question is actually a product of collaboration between Thesleff and myself: 
Alican and Thesleff 2013. Thesleff's insight, however, predates our formal collaboration, 
making it both appropriate and convenient to abbreviate repeated references to our article 
as 'Thesleff 2013'. Thesleff's personal initiative unfolds through several of his earlier works: 
1989; 1993; 1999 (= 2009, 383–506). My own efforts intersect with that initiative in two 
places: Alican 2012 (87–110, 110–29) and Alican 2015.
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of mainstream interpretation. This is why I have taken to calling him a maverick, 
both in person and in print (Alican 2012, 185–88). He has yet to correct me on 
that. His outlook on the Forms alone reveals why he has not voiced an objection: 
He is a maverick, and he is comfortable with that label. One would have to be to 
produce and promote the ideas he does.
Thesleff's positions are always fluid, his work, always in progress. What 
we get in his books and articles are snapshots of an ever developing viewpoint. 
To some extent, this is true of all academic work. But with Thesleff, it might well 
be the common denominator of his intellectual output. This makes it all the more 
difficult, and that much more important, to keep up with his investigation of any 
given subject. My aim here is to explicate his unorthodox approach to Plato's on-
tology, with particular emphasis on what he does with the Forms.
2. The General Enterprise
The most striking feature of the general enterprise is its ontological elitism. 
Thesleff does not recognise every abstraction in Plato as a Form.2 Nor does he 
take what we normally regard as Platonic Forms to be, one and all, the same kind 
of thing: each one simply a Form, just like any other. He sees a fundamental dif-
ference between, say, the Form for bed and that for motion, and further, between 
either one of those and the Form for justice — examples likely to be familiar even 
without specific references. He proposes rethinking Plato's Forms with a view to 
preserving the variegation present in the original as opposed to perpetuating the 
uniformity prevailing in the literature.
His rethinking inspires a tripartite classification consisting of Ideal Forms, 
Conceptual Forms, and Relational Forms. This arrangement comes with caveats 
reflecting uncertainties in the dialogues themselves. The following provisions in 
particular are important for a thorough appreciation:
2  The first letter of 'Form' (or 'Idea') is capitalised whenever the reference is to Plato's Forms. 
Individual Forms take on an initial capital when this would help avoid ambiguity (but not 
otherwise), as in the case of a direct comparison between a Form and an instantiation bearing 
the same name, for example, Justice itself and justice in the court (or the Just itself and a just 
law).
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• The classification is a thought experiment, as is Plato's own approach to 
philosophy.3 There can be no proof in the standard sense.
• The taxonomy has little to do with chronology: To affirm differences be-
tween types of Forms is not to affirm developmentalism.4
• The three divisions are decidedly different from one another, so much so 
as to defy being brought together under the general rubric of Forms, a 
label retained for convenience and familiarity.
• Despite fundamental differences, one kind of Form can, depending on 
context, take on the characteristics of another, specifically with certain 
Conceptual Forms and Relational Forms coming to resemble Ideal Forms.
We may add to these what would be the most important condition of all, though 
not directly about the Forms: the understanding of Plato's philosophical vision in 
terms of a sliding scale of reality represented by the metaphor of two levels in one 
world. This is Thesleff's alternative to the traditional two-world interpretation 
where Forms reside in one world and particulars in another. The caveat here is 
that the focal point of Plato's metaphysics is not the relationship between Forms 
and particulars, nor the diversification experiments with Forms, but the stratifica-
tion of reality in a hierarchical ontological structure consisting of a higher and 
lower level and untold layers in between. Forms and particulars, not to mention 
the different kinds of Forms, are distinguished through this two-level vision — 
not merely a heuristic tool for understanding Plato but an outlook actually present 
in Plato.
This means, among other things, that Thesleff's classification of Forms is 
an initiative to tidy up the most important features of Plato's ontology rather 
than an attempt to provide an exhaustive catalogue of Forms recognised in the 
scholarly tradition. But even after we make allowances for any and all caveats, 
Thesleff's account leaves us with questions that can fruitfully be pursued further 
and problems that cannot fairly be placed entirely on Plato's doorstep:
3  Thesleff uses the model to make better sense of Plato, who was in the habit of using his own 
models, among them, the Forms, to make better sense of the world.
4  See Thesleff (2013, 20, cf. 14, 16, 24, 33, including nn. 4, 10). Admittedly, Plato may 
have come up with the different types of Forms as a result of different thought experiments 
conducted at different times. But the resulting variety functions as an organic whole rather than 
a succession of increasingly better models of exactly the same thing. One category of Forms is 
not an improved version of another. For more on his views on chronology, see Thesleff (1982 
[= 2009, 143–382]; 1989, 1–26).
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• What is the difference between Forms and concepts?
• What is the difference between Forms and universals?
• What is the ontological status of Forms, or, to elaborate, what is the mode 
of their existence, or the nature and implications of their reality?
• How does the ontological status of Ideal Forms differ from that of Con-
ceptual Forms and Relational Forms?
The first three questions cannot be answered without expanding on them to dis-
tinguish between the kinds of Forms envisaged. And this is what gives rise to the 
fourth question. To be fair, Thesleff answers all these questions. But his answers 
can leave the reader wondering, for example, what the difference is between 
horseness and justice, the former, presumably a Conceptual Form, the latter, defi-
nitely an Ideal Form. Horseness lacks the positive intrinsic value characteristic of 
(common and unique to) Ideal Forms and therefore present in justice. But apart 
from that, both horseness and justice are universals that exist in reality and out-
side the mind, thus pointing to a shared ontological platform.
To put it crudely, it would seem that both horseness and justice are the same 
kind of thing from an ontological standpoint, differing only in their axiological 
dimensions. We may then press Thesleff more generally on whether Ideal Forms 
really differ from the other two kinds of Forms in any way other than the presence 
or absence of positive intrinsic value.5 This goes to the heart of his classification 
scheme, and we would, accordingly, do well to examine the main organisational 
principles behind that arrangement.
Despite the various uncertainties, always embraced unapologetically, 
Thesleff's perspective comes with several clear and strong commitments:
• All Forms are objectively real: They are ontologically independent both 
of the mind and of particulars.
• All Forms are at least universals (a provision allowing Forms to function 
like universals while having a greater claim to reality).6
5  The notion of positive intrinsic value in Forms naturally brings to mind the possibility of 
negative intrinsic value in Forms. Thesleff devotes considerable attention to the question of 
negative Forms (the bad itself, the unjust itself, the ugly itself, and so on), primarily with a 
view to establishing that there are none, or, more specifically, that Plato does not countenance 
negative (Ideal) Forms. This is a developing theme (1999, 63–67 [= 2009, 447–50]; 2013, 
40–42).
6  See Thesleff (2013, 19–21). Note that "Forms are what universals fail to be" (19, n. 20), a 
friendly amendment to McCabe's dictum that "Forms are what particulars fail to be" (1994, 
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• All Forms are causally efficacious, functioning as reasons, explanations, 
or causes of sorts for the phenomena they represent.
• Ontological Status: Some Forms are more real, so to speak, than others, 
depending on the relative value and importance Plato attaches to them.
• Ontological Ascent: Forms with a lower ontological standing (Conceptual 
Forms and Relational Forms) can approximate to those of the highest on-
tological standing (Ideal Forms).7
The commitments enumerated here contain the answers to the questions posed 
above, especially in consideration of the caveats mentioned in the beginning. It 
may be helpful, all the same, to retrace such connections to make sure they are 
intact. This paper is dedicated to doing just that, not necessarily by taking up 
each of the foregoing questions exactly as expressed above but by trying out the 
vantage point Thesleff recommends for a clear view of the world as Plato saw it.
3. The Stratification of Reality
Thesleff's primary mission in Platonica is to replace the traditional two-world 
interpretation with a two-level alternative.8 Perhaps his greatest contribution to 
Plato scholarship has been his campaign to unite the disparate worlds of the nou-
menal and the phenomenal in a single world with two levels sandwiching an 
indefinite multitude of subdivisions in a hierarchical stratification of reality.9 The 
possibility and sensibility of bringing Forms and particulars together in a single 
60).
7  The term first appears in Thesleff (2013): 22, n. 21, 43. See 29–33, 42, for discussion, 43–44, 
for recapitulation.
8  Other notable reactions to the tradition of two worlds in Plato include: Brentlinger (1972); 
Broadie (2004); Butler (2007); Ferguson (1921); Nails (2013); Nehamas (1975); Robjant 
(2012). See also n. 9 below.
9  A note on ontological versus epistemological frames of reference may be in order: In 
advocating his two-level model over the two-world model, Thesleff (2013, 15, n. 7) is concerned 
exclusively with the ontology of the matter. This is not the only possible approach, nor even the 
only actual one, and he is sensitive to the difference. He finds the epistemological perspective 
irrelevant to his own project and refers readers primarily to the work of Smith (2000, 2012) but 
also to contributions by Rowe (2005) and Butler (2007). See further: Fine (1978, 1990) and the 
reaction to Fine by Gonzalez (1996).
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world convinces him to lay to rest the thoroughgoing metaphysical dualism shap-
ing the reception and presentation of Plato through the ages.
Thesleff locates the origins of the two-level model in the work of De Vogel 
but accepts responsibility for having developed it as an interpretive paradigm.10 
He embraces the two-level model as the root of all Platonic thinking, a philo-
sophical vision more basic than, say, the so-called theory of Forms.11 It is, in fact, 
this feature of his discovery, namely, its relevance and reliability as a standard of 
interpretation, that so excites Thesleff, who declares the two-level perspective a 
prerequisite to a proper understanding of Plato.
Other basic perspectives, however, could be at play here. Opposition, to 
name one, is a prime candidate. Thesleff admits this, or, more accurately, he in-
vokes and publicises it, wherever he discusses the two-level model (1993, 21; 
1999, 7–10, 11–25 [= 2009, 393–96, 397–410]; 2013, 17–19), which he pre-
sents as the natural culmination of a general preoccupation with opposition rela-
tions shaping the prevailing sociocultural mindset. It may be useful to probe even 
deeper into how the Greek conception of opposition may have influenced Plato's 
thought, particularly in leading him to develop a two-level outlook.
Although pursuing this in detail here might be distracting, a rewarding dis-
traction of this sort is to be found in the early work of G. E. R. Lloyd, a somewhat 
younger contemporary of Thesleff. During the period that Thesleff was moving 
from Pythagoras to Plato, Lloyd came out with a series of contributions (1962, 
1964, 1966) to our understanding of the role of opposition in ancient Greek phi-
losophy, with especial emphasis on tracing its roots in ancient Greek thought in 
general and demonstrating its growing hold on Greek philosophy in particular. 
According to Lloyd (1962), cultural preconceptions regarding opposition were 
prevalent in ancient Greece, among other places, with a strong impact and trace-
able influence on early philosophical ruminations ranging from the Presocratics 
to Aristotle.
Thesleff's work (1993, 21; 1999, 7–10, 11–25 [= 2009, 393–96, 397–
410]; 2013, 17–19) is largely in agreement with that of Lloyd in regard to the 
emergence and development of opposition as a paradigm in Greek philosophy, 
10  See De Vogel (1986, 50, 62, 145–48, 159–212, especially 159–71); cf. Thesleff (1993, 
17–45; 1999, 11–52 [= 2009, 397–436]; 2013, 17, including nn. 14, 15).
11  The theoreticity of Plato's Forms is a thorny question. Thesleff does not explore the matter 
personally, instead referring readers to a selection of substantive discussions (2013, 15, n. 6): 
Annas (1981, 217–41); Gonzalez (2002, 31–83); Hyland (2002, 257–72); Sayre (1994, 167–
99; 2002, 169–91); Williams (2006, 148–86).
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though Thesleff (after his early work on Pythagoras) has remained more strict-
ly focussed on Plato, with Lloyd concentrating partly on Aristotle and mostly 
on Greek science . Inspired by what Plato did with the opposition framework 
he inherited , specifically with the complementary contrasts he evidently pre-
ferred to polar opposites , Thesleff urges us to abandon the two worlds of the 
metaphysical dualism traditionally attributed to Plato in favour of two levels in a 
single world.
Possibly the strongest objection to the two-level alternative lies in the 
question of transcendence: What exactly do the transcendent Forms transcend? 
And where do they do this transcending? Does not the very idea of transcendence 
require a separate world?
These amount to basically the same question, and it is, in any case, an open 
question. Today, we face a similar problem in the choice between a universe and 
a multiverse as the proper interpretation of reality. Science is increasingly favour-
ing a multiverse, at bottom, a plurality of universes. While physicists assure us 
that this is a possibility — that what we have been exploring as the universe is ac-
tually just one of many (possibly infinitely many) universes that are inaccessible 
to us — the assurance, or even flat out proof, is not convincing, nor even relevant, 
if what is meant by 'universe' in the first place is the totality of everything that ex-
ists, the whole of reality, accessible or not, so that the postulated 'multiverse' adds 
nothing to the concept of 'universe'. In this sense, the scenario of a multiverse be-
yond the universe is not meaningful, let alone being tenable. Yet in the sense that 
the universe is what we have so far been able to make of reality with the science 
and technology available to us, it is both meaningful and useful to think about 
what lies beyond. It seems, in the end, to be a matter of perspective, a matter, that 
is, of what we mean by 'universe' (what we take to be the referent of the term).
Thesleff's levels are like that. While Thesleff himself does not present any 
of this as a matter of perspective, instead asserting unequivocally that his own 
view is right (and anything in contradiction wrong), if the analogy could never-
theless be extended to his case, he would come down on the side of the universe 
as opposed to the multiverse. He assigns a single world to the whole of real-
ity, while handling diversity in levels. What others divide between two different 
worlds, he distributes throughout a single world with two main levels and multi-
ple sublevels.
But can two levels in one world accommodate the division between mate-
rial and immaterial reality? This is the question to be asked here. And it is not the 
same question as whether it makes more sense to speak of a plurality of worlds or 
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of a plurality of levels within a single world. Those who postulate a second world 
do so for no other reason than to accommodate Plato's notion of transcendence, 
which they take to require an existence outside the familiar world of space and 
time. Thesleff, in contrast, combines everything, including any transcending to 
be done, in one and the same world. The two-world interpretation is entirely con-
sistent with what we normally understand by transcendence while falling short 
in explaining how the two separate worlds are supposed to account for the cor-
respondence Plato sees between Forms and particulars. The two-level interpreta-
tion supports a curious sense of transcendence, with everything still belonging to 
the same world, wherein nothing can quite properly be said to have transcended 
anything, at least not in the ordinary sense of the term (as being or going beyond 
that which is transcended), but it is, for the very same reason, fully responsive 
to all manner of connection and correspondence between Forms and particulars.
What, then, is the answer? Can two levels in the same world accommodate 
the distinction between the physical and the abstract? Probably not if we think 
of this and similar contrasts in terms of polar opposition. Nothing can reconcile 
reality with what lies beyond. This is because nothing lies beyond reality. On the 
other hand, the physical does not necessarily exhaust reality. Perhaps the proper 
distinction is between reality as we know it and reality as it is. Thesleff's recom-
mendation is always to think of such distinctions (material / immaterial, sensible / 
intelligible, and so on) in terms of complementary perspectives, as in the contrast 
between, say, upstairs and downstairs.12 In this sense, not only are the apparent 
opposites compatible but they are also complementary, neither one comprehensi-
ble without the other.
This is my own reaction to the puzzle of transcendence in a single world. 
It is thoroughly exploratory. Thesleff's is more elegant: Writing to me in person, 
he denies the problem altogether, as he takes 'transcendence' in a weaker sense 
than the standard philosophical/theological notion of a reality outside or beyond 
the world. Under his interpretation, the relevant sense of 'transcendence' is not 
(pace my playful label above to mark the difference) a 'curious' one invoking an 
'otherworldly' existence without any 'other world' to speak of but a weaker one 
12  Thesleff typically explicates this distinction — or rather relationship, perhaps a communion 
(koinōnia) of sorts — with an abundance of examples, not just his own but also Plato's. Some 
of his favourites (2013, 19, including n. 19) are the divided line in the Republic (6,509d–511e), 
the ladder of love in the Symposium (209e–212a), and the world-soul in the Timaeus (35a–36d). 
See the following discussion through the end of this section (including the corresponding notes) 
for the use he makes of the divided line.
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precluding the implied dissociation with the world (the only one there is).13
Thesleff and I are not in disagreement over the nature of the two-level mod-
el. Our reactions to the putative puzzle converge toward the same end. Thesleff's 
response is more solid, leaving no room for a problem to solve. Mine is more ad-
venturous, entertaining the standard (strong) sense of transcendence while seek-
ing a solution within the limitations of a single world. Strictly speaking, no such 
adventure can succeed in a scenario both requiring and rejecting an 'other world', 
but the metaphorical analysis above is the best way I know to demonstrate the 
significance of Thesleff's promotion of complementary over contradictory oppo-
sition. It may not show how to remain in the world while leaving it behind, but it 
does show what goes on in Plato's world.
Thesleff has been in the habit of using a visual aid to probe Plato's world, 
which he believes to be built on the relevant (complementary) sort of opposi-
tion. The design is simple, a line going through a list of ten pairs of contrasts as 
follows:14
one same stable divine soul leading intellect truth knowledge defined
many different changing human body being-led senses appearance opinion undefined
The vertical alignment of the corresponding elements in each pair of contrasts 
depicts an asymmetrical relationship, basically a sociocultural valuation pattern 
(of which the list is representative rather than exhaustive) developing into philo-
sophical insight, with the top component considered superior to the bottom but 
neither contemplated apart from the other. The illustration is not so much about 
13  This is consistent with Thesleff's ever vigilant approach to transcendence in Plato. He has 
long denied a 'transcendence' beyond the world, as it were, and has for this reason favoured the 
use of scare quotes for the term itself: "It is natural, also, to infer from the two-level vision that 
all 'Ideas' (whatever terms used [= 'Ideal Forms' in 2013]), are (in spite of the κοινωνία between 
the levels) somehow 'transcendent,' i.e. distinct (χωρίς) from and pointedly primary in relation 
to sensible things (though they are certainly not 'beyond being'): being 'divine,' invisible and 
attainable by intellect only, they belong entirely to the higher level in Plato's vision" (1999, 58 
[= 2009, 442]; cf. 55 [= 2009, 439] n. 97; 62 [= 2009, 446] n. 111). It is important to remember, 
however, that this distinction is still within the sliding scale of a single reality where neither 
end is cut off from the other in complete isolation or polar opposition. The chōrismós here is 
not a hard 'separation' (or 'separability') but a softer 'distinction' (or 'distinguishability'). See 
further n. 31 below.
14  The visual aid in question can be found in several of Thesleff's works, either in the precise 
form presented here (1999, 27 [= 2009, 411]; 2013, 17) or in a variation (1993, 21).
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the Forms as it is about the more basic opposition paradigm Thesleff believes 
to have led Plato to develop his two-level outlook, which, in turn, supports and 
encourages the distinction between Forms and particulars (or which, from our 
perspective, helps explain that distinction). The distinction between Forms and 
the things of which they are Forms makes more sense in a single reality divided 
up in this manner than it does in two separate worlds — where the Forms would 
be without substance, the things, without Form, and each without a frame of ref-
erence to identify it as what it is.
Thesleff's visual aid is, in a sense, a simplified version of the more popular 
one in Plato, the divided line of the Republic (6,509d–511e). Thesleff is, in fact, 
quite fond of the original simile, embracing it both as evidence of Plato's two-
level vision and as a model for his (Thesleff's but also Plato's) classification of 
Forms. The four segments of Plato's divided line correspond to subdivisions in 
the two main levels of Thesleff's scheme, placing the Forms on the upper level, 
the particulars, on the lower.15 To put it in Plato's terms, Ideal Forms belong at the 
top (right after to agathon), at the level of noesis, Conceptual Forms come next, 
at the level of dianoia, and Relational Forms constitute a lateral projection of the 
general partition scheme. The two lower segments of Plato's line are reserved for 
physical things, at the level of pistis, and for images or shadows, at the level of 
eikasia, together corresponding to the single (but divisible and actually stratified) 
lower level of Thesleff. Details are best left to the next section, dedicated exclu-
sively to Thesleff's classification of Forms.
4. The Classification of Forms
Thesleff's stratification of reality is the hermeneutic anchor for his classification 
of Forms. This is not to say that his two-level model automatically suggests the 
divisions he proposes. It does not. But what he does with the Forms is a natu-
ral extension of what he does with Plato's ontology. Having long contemplated 
distinctions between different kinds of entities collectively regarded simply and 
without discrimination as Forms (1989; 1993; 1999 [= 2009, 383–506]), Thesleff 
has settled, in his latest thinking (2013), on a full-blown classification scheme. 
15  This is another occasion to remember that Thesleff presents the two primary levels as a 
metaphor for a comprehensive stratification scheme with an indefinitely large number of 
subdivisions. Wherever he refers to either of the two main levels, or to both at once, he means 
to include any and all sublayers without specifically mentioning them.
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Summarised above (in section 2), this is a grouping with three divisions: Ideal 
Forms; Conceptual Forms; Relational Forms.
All three are universals with objective reality. As Thesleff puts it, they are 
'at least' universals, which leaves open how much more they can be and what 
exactly each might be. It turns out that they are decidedly different things. They 
differ not only in the aspects of reality to which they correspond as universals but 
also in the qualities that make them what they are as Forms.
Regarding their 'phenomenal range', to coin a phrase, (1) Ideal Forms serve 
as value paradigms, though what they are in and of themselves is noetic reali-
ties of superlative intrinsic value; (2) Conceptual Forms cover types, properties, 
events, actions, and experiences; (3) Relational Forms embody correlative uni-
versal concepts taken in pairs of asymmetrical contrasts jointly responsible for 
the fundamental structure of the cosmos. In a sense, albeit a simplistic sense, 
Ideal Forms account for values, Relational Forms, for relations, leaving Con-
ceptual Forms to represent all other relevant universals, be they natural kinds, or 
their properties, or anything else open to phenomenal experience, such as events 
or actions.16
As for what these Forms are qua Forms, Ideal Forms differ from the other 
two kinds through a host of features, including transcendence, intelligibility, and 
comparable refinements familiar from the long tradition of Plato scholarship.17 
Ideal Forms are much like the fantabulous entities associated with the gods, and 
accorded a status bordering on divinity, as in the Phaedo and the Phaedrus.18 In 
comparison, Conceptual Forms and Relational Forms come across as little more 
than glorified concepts, universals with objective reality. They exist, to be sure, 
but evidently not as anything nearly so special as Ideal Forms.
16  The reason this is a simplistic account is that Ideal Forms are not values, Relational Forms 
are not relations, and Conceptual Forms are not concepts. Each is the Form for the type of 
phenomenal manifestation it represents, not that manifestation itself.
17  The full list includes seven features identifying Ideal Forms as transcendent, intelligible, 
paradigmatic, perfect, immutable, simple, and unique. Thesleff lists these as commonly 
recognised features in the literature as opposed to personal discoveries or innovations, and 
he admits the possibility of additions, deletions, and modifications to the list (2013, 27–28, 
cf. nn. 33, 34).
18  Phaedo 78b–80b: the analogic argument where the soul is likened to the gods and the Forms, 
thus implying that the latter two are themselves comparable in some way. Phaedrus 246e–249d: 
the cosmic journey of enlightenment where the soul of the philosopher (248a–249d), together 
with the gods (246e–247e), eventually beholds the Forms.
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The 'glorified concepts' analogy, however, runs the risk of understatement. 
It must be understood to include not just ontological independence but ontologi-
cal eminence as well. As vague as that may sound, it captures the superiority of 
the lesser two types of Forms over things that are not Forms at all. The upper 
level of Plato's world is not just for Ideal Forms but for all Forms. Everything else 
belongs to the lower level. Furthermore, the eminence in question is not strictly 
ontological but broadly metaphysical. At the very least, these 'glorified concepts', 
in addition to their objective reality, boast a causal efficacy of some sort. All 
Forms, no matter which of the three divisions they may belong to, function in an 
explanatory capacity on a cosmic scale, though it is not clear whether this is a 
logical, cosmological, psychological, or yet some other kind of explanation. The 
lack of specificity in this regard is not a shortcoming of Thesleff's account but a 
feature of Plato's. Thesleff acknowledges a causal role for the Forms, but he 
does not pursue it in any detail, partly because he has a greater interest in 
ontology than in cosmology, and partly because he does not think we can get 
very far with a reconstruction of Platonic causality.19
The relevance of ontological/cosmological eminence across the board at 
the upper level of reality is best reflected in Thesleff's allowance for the possibil-
ity of ontological ascent: This is a process (or phenomenon) through which the 
boundaries break down between Ideal Forms, on the one hand, and Conceptual 
19  Thesleff is not impressed with our prospects for discovering a coherent account of causation, 
or of causal explanation, in Plato. He does recognise the various attempts in the canonical 
corpus — where causality is examined in the Forms, in the soul, in the demiurge, and even as 
a category of its own (e.g., Philebus 23d ff.) — but he also notes the absence of a connection 
toward a unified perspective (1999, 102 [= 2009, 483]). He finds the approach unclear even 
where the focus seems to be exclusively on the Forms (2013, 28, n. 34), adding, in fact, that 
there is no such restriction to the Forms. What may appear to be about the Forms is more 
generally about the levels: "To put it somewhat aristotelically, there is a 'causal' relation 
between the levels, even more manifestly than between Forms and particulars" (1999, 30 
[= 2009, 415]). Yet, even then, observes Thesleff, "one cannot claim that the upper level is 
always or predominantly 'effecting' the lower level phenomena" (1999, 102 [= 2009, 483]). He 
is equally cautious about what to make of the foundational principles of the agrapha dogmata. 
Rejecting the Tübingen tendency to take the archai as "'causes' in the Presocratic sense, which 
would mean stressing their 'material' and 'efficient' aspects", he interprets the subordination of 
the hen to the ahoristos duas as an indication that the archai "combine the 'formal' and 'final' 
aspects of Aristotelian causes" (1999, 101–02 [= 2009, 483]). He makes no commitments in 
this regard, offers no assurances. He warns that this is not so much about Plato as it is about 
Aristotle: "But of course 'aetiology' is an Aristotelian issue" (1999, 102 [= 2009, 483]). Even 
his call for caution is cautious: "The question of how to apply Aristotelian 'causes' (or rather, 
aetiology) to this complex, can perhaps not be definitely solved" (1999, 101 [= 2009, 483]).
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Forms and Relational Forms, on the other. Any Conceptual Form can, in princi-
ple, approximate to Ideal Forms, thereby coming to resemble them in every way 
except for the possession of intrinsic value. And the same holds for the dominant 
(more valuable or more important) element in the asymmetrically paired correla-
tive universal concepts constituting Relational Forms. Hence, the string of fea-
tures normally reserved for Ideal Forms, including the qualities of transcendence 
and intelligibility, ceases under ontological ascent to be a means for differentiat-
ing between Ideal Forms and the other two types.
Ontological ascent opens up interesting possibilities, engendering greater 
flexibility within the classification scheme, but it also comes with implications 
that may be interpreted as complications. This is at the centre of the discussion 
in the next section. At this point, it is better to proceed with a closer look at the 
system itself, taking stock of the details of all three categories of Forms.
To start with, what makes Ideal Forms so special? It may seem upon initial 
consideration that they are little more than moral exemplars, paradigms of hu-
man excellence. But they are more than that. First, they are more than paradigms: 
They are real entities albeit ones that transcend sense-experience, therefore be-
ing accessible through the mind alone. As mentioned, they also have some sort 
of causal or explanatory relevance, though we need not dwell on this here, as 
moral values of the ordinary sort may also be said to have causal or explanatory 
relevance insofar as they tend to be invoked as reasons for action, that is, cited as 
justification by moral agents performing moral acts. They are, in short, noetic re-
alities. Second, their connection with the phenomenal level of reality covers more 
than moral value, extending, for example, to aesthetic and religious value as well, 
and possibly also to other categories of value. As a matter of fact, the division is 
not between moral and nonmoral value (nor between aesthetic and nonaesthetic 
value, nor between religious and nonreligious value) but between intrinsic and 
instrumental value. Hence, even something that is neither moral (justice) nor aes-
thetic (beauty) nor religious (piety) may be an Ideal Form. The Form of knowl-
edge comes to mind (Parmenides 134a–e; Phaedrus 247d–e). And the same may 
perhaps be said of the Form of life (Phaedo 106d).
As for the other two types of Forms, the fact that they are both, in many 
respects, less valuable (or less important, or less significant, and so on, all with 
reference to Plato's discernible outlook), and as it seems, equally less valuable, 
should not be taken as an indication that they are merely variations on a theme. 
They are different sorts of things and they play different roles in Plato's attempt to 
make sense of the world around him. More to the point, Relational Forms are not 
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a subdivision of Conceptual Forms that just happen to be taken in pairs of com-
plementary opposites.20 Relational Forms have the distinct function, collectively, 
of illustrating the constitution of the universe.
As with any classification scheme, two questions arise with respect to 
Thesleff's: (1) Is the taxonomy exhaustive? (2) How does it compare with actual 
or possible alternatives?
The answer to the first question is that the aim is not so much exhaustive 
coverage as it is holistic codification. It is more important that each division be a 
verifiable or defensible reflection of the Platonic corpus than that absolutely noth-
ing be left out. Thesleff has never been after a complete catalogue of everything 
that may pass for a Form, but he has been interested in making sense of the variety 
of entities (or constructs, depending on whether one sees Plato as discovering or 
inventing these things) that may be organised in accordance with Plato's ontology 
and his general philosophical outlook, preferably in a demonstrable correspond-
ence with both. This being so, his classification of Forms has been inspired and 
shaped by his two-level interpretation of Plato. Nothing that is not supported by 
this model makes it into the classification. And the same can be said of anything 
that happens to be either too vague or too controversial for accurate assignment.21
The answer to the second question would have to be on a case-by-case ba-
sis. This is a matter of comparing Thesleff's classification with whatever happens 
to be nominated in its place. While alternatives have not yet appeared in print in 
the form of a direct challenge, both actual and possible alternatives can be found 
in much that has been proposed independently. They can sometimes be found 
in generalist commentaries on Plato (companions, guidebooks, overviews), re-
quired by their nature to make the 'theory' of Forms accessible to a wide audience. 
Mohr (2010, 5), for example, divides Plato's Forms into five groups, which he 
takes to represent the traditional list of Forms: moral and aesthetic notions (jus-
tice itself, goodness itself, beauty itself); mathematical concepts (three, oddness, 
even, square, sphere); relations (double, half, large, small, octave, speed); notions 
20  See Thesleff (2013, 35–36, especially n. 54) on this aspect of the difference between 
Relational Forms and Conceptual Forms.
21  The prime examples are mathematicals (numbers and shapes) and immanent Forms. Regarding 
mathematicals, Thesleff notes in passing that they can be classified under Conceptual Forms, 
though he shows no enthusiasm for further consideration, first, because he is not convinced 
of the subject's relevance to his primary project, second, because he is not optimistic about a 
resolution in any event (2013, 21–22, especially n. 21). And he shows no greater interest in the 
possibility or implications of immanence — the chief implication being 'immanent Forms' — 
declaring the question "largely non liquet" (2013, 33; cf. n. 31 below).
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that range widely over other notions (being, sameness, difference, motion, rest); 
natural kinds (earth, air, fire, water). Mohr is right to offer this as a 'traditional' 
list. But nothing here contradicts Thesleff's model.
Examples can be multiplied indefinitely, I suspect, with much the same 
result. Alternatives are unlikely to be opposed diametrically to Thesleff's clas-
sification, instead presenting different ways of arranging roughly the same items, 
perhaps coming up with a division or two which Thesleff handles at the level of 
subdivisions. A broader survey may prove more informative. A combination of 
both questions could, for example, be taken up in an alternative classification 
grounded in the distinction between transcendence and immanence. Thus, instead 
of Thesleff's three divisions, we would have transcendent Forms versus imma-
nent Forms.22
Actually, the matter of transcendence versus immanence is not so much 
a distinction between types of Forms as it is a debate on the nature of Forms, 
specifically on the possible phenomenal manifestation of Forms. Employing it 
as a means of differentiating between Forms (just because some dialogues speak 
of the 'F' in us and so on) seems to beg the question. That, of course, may not be 
altogether fair from the perspective of anyone collating apparently endless exam-
ples of transcendent Forms and immanent Forms throughout the Platonic corpus, 
wondering why they are both in abundance if they may not be taken as two dif-
ferent types of Forms.
A case in point is a discussion note by Demos (1948, 456–60), report-
edly drawing and expanding on earlier work both by himself (1939, 179) and by 
Cornford (1939, 78). Demos objects to interpreting the interplay between Forms 
and particulars as a correspondence between what and that, in other words, as a 
juxtaposition of essence and instance, thus equating whatness (structure) with 
universals while leaving nothing but brute fact for particulars (1948, 456). He 
envisages Plato's Forms as combining elements both of universals and of par-
ticulars. Although he does not claim to be advancing a classification scheme, his 
discussion is dedicated to elucidating the distinction between what he calls 'Ideal 
Forms' (or 'Abstract Forms') and 'Empirical Forms' (or 'Phenomenal Forms'). The 
difference is that the former are grasped by nous whereas the latter are found in 
22  This is not necessarily incompatible with Thesleff's scheme, as both transcendent Forms 
and immanent Forms can arguably be divided further into Ideal Forms, Conceptual Forms, 
and Relational Forms. Or perhaps the three divisions can be assumed to be under transcendent 
Forms, and their manifestations, under immanent Forms. Either way, the result is an alternative 
to Thesleff's model, not necessarily a contradiction of it.
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sense-experience. Ideal Forms are transcendent, invisible, and abstract. Empiri-
cal Forms are immanent, visible, and concrete.
The question, then, is whether this distinction deserves the recognition de-
nied it by those who reject immanent Forms as a type of Form (not to mention 
those who contest the very possibility of immanence for Forms). It does not. 
While the question of immanence certainly requires our full attention, it provides 
no grounds for a classification of Forms. This is because transcendence is a defin-
ing characteristic of Forms (routinely so with the undifferentiated Forms of the 
Platonic tradition), which precludes immanence as an alternative (for anything 
that is supposed to remain a Form). When we begin talking about the difference 
between transcendent Forms and immanent Forms (or between Ideal Forms and 
Empirical Forms in the terminology of Demos), we are no longer talking about 
two different types of Forms but focussing on two different kinds of things. We 
are, in effect, talking about Forms versus things that would be Forms if they were 
transcendent instead of immanent.
This leaves open the broader question of immanence, that is, the question 
whether the immanence of Forms is possible at all. Does rejecting immanence as 
the basis for a proper classification of Forms require rejecting immanence alto-
gether? It may not be a requirement, but it is a good idea. A Form is not the kind 
of thing that can be immanent, whether or not this is used as a basis for classifica-
tion.23 This position may seem to be undermined by the countless examples typi-
cally adduced in favour of immanence, starting with the parade example of the 
tallness, or largeness, in Simmias (Phaedo 102b–d), but all such talk is metaphor 
for whatever correspondence there may be between Forms and particulars, not 
evidence of Forms that are incarnate in the physical realm, which would be tan-
tamount to evidence of Forms that are not Forms. A so-called immanent Form is 
no more a Form than the tallness in Simmias is Tallness itself (auto kath' hauto).
23  Note, however, that denying this claim does not require holding that Forms are immanent 
instead of transcendent, just that they are immanent. Perl (1999, 339–62, see especially 
339, n. 1, 361–62), for one, argues that transcendence and immanence are not contradictory 
positions, crediting Fine for having already established this with her two articles, one each, 
on transcendence (1984, 31–87) and immanence (1986, 71–97). On this view, it would not be 
wrong to claim that Forms are transcendent, and it would not be wrong to claim that they are 
immanent, but it would be wrong to claim, as I do, that they are transcendent and not immanent.
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What, then, is the tallness in Simmias, if not a Form?24 It is nothing more 
than the instantiation of Tallness — an indication25 that the thing is in conformity 
with the Form, that it is displaying the essential quality, or the defining character-
istic, of the Form, that, in this case, Simmias is tall.26 The proper explanation is 
not that Tallness itself (auto kath' hauto) is in Simmias but that the physical rela-
24  My dialectical excursion below is not a substitute for Thesleff's own answer. See his 
assessment of the opposition between tallness and smallness, presented in the broader context 
of his explication of the (limited) relationship between Forms and opposites (1999, 50–52 
[= 2009, 434–36]). Both tallness and smallness are at best Conceptual Forms in his terminology. 
While it would be difficult (in the relevant context) to mistake them for Ideal Forms, note 
well that they are also not Relational Forms (a mistake less difficult to make). The opposition 
between tallness and smallness does not make them a pair of Relational Forms, which, as noted 
above (n. 20 and the text to which it refers), are not simply opposite Conceptual Forms but 
correlative universal categories of metaphysical significance.
25  This is a special kind of indication, bringing together the phenomenal and the noumenal, 
and combining empirical evidence with rational reflection, in what can best be described as a 
'bridge' between the upper and lower levels of Plato's universe. See Thesleff (1999, 33 [= 2009, 
417–18]) for the notion of bridges in Plato's stratification of reality. It is particularly noteworthy 
that he identifies Plato's Forms as the philosopher's "most explicit, ambitious and famous" 
attempt to bridge the levels.
26  It may be objected that this is just what is meant by the immanence of Forms, or that it 
falls under what is involved in the immanence of Forms, in short, that it counts as immanence. 
(See Fine 1986, 71–97, especially 71–73, for the relevant sense of being 'in' something, and 
74, for the tallness in Simmias. See Perl 1999, 339–62, especially 345–47, for the tallness in 
Simmias.) The objection, in other words, would be that I have misunderstood immanence in 
general, whether or not I have understood Plato. Either way, I do not see how we can all agree 
that it is not Tallness itself (but the quality of being tall) that is in Simmias and still disagree 
whether the Form is in the thing. Or perhaps we do not all agree on the first part of the apparent 
puzzle, as Fine (1986, 73), for example, speaks of the Form's being in the thing as a property 
('being in the thing as a property' as an acceptable sense of 'being in the thing', and accordingly, 
'the Form's being in the thing as a property' as the relevant sense of 'the Form's being in the 
thing'), which, I agree, does not mean that the Form is nothing more than a property of the 
thing. This may be a matter of drawing more or less the same conclusion but expressing it 
differently. My interpretation seems to be closer to that of Devereux, who submits that what is 
in Simmias is the "immanent character of largeness" (1994, 88, cf. 66, 73–74), not largeness 
itself. See Allen (1997, 116–19) for general agreement, Gonzalez (2002, 39–40) for opposition. 
Devereux's (1994, 70–71, including especially n. 15) rejection of immanence for Forms turns 
on a distinction (in the relevant part of the Phaedo) between Plato's usage of eidos, reserved for 
nonimmanent Forms, and idea, reserved for the 'character' that comes to characterise or to be 
'in' the sensible thing. (I am reporting the justification, not confirming the observation.) My own 
impression was shaped independently of the Greek, relying solely on my (mis)understanding 
of immanence.
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tion of Simmias to Socrates, presumably coupled with other relations of the same 
sort (as in Phaedo in relation to Simmias), helps understand (recollect) Tallness 
itself, which is not itself in anything. If the Form were in something, it would not 
require recollection, just observation, thus making anamnēsis redundant.27
Some manner of experimentation may be helpful here. What if the prob-
lem were a matter of conflating physical and abstract instantiations while trying 
to distinguish between transcendent and immanent Forms? I am not suggesting 
that there is a meaningful difference between physical and abstract instantiations. 
I am speculating that we do perhaps proceed as if there were. What seems (to 
some) to be a legitimate distinction between transcendent and immanent Forms 
may instead be a confusion between physical and abstract instantiations. We usu-
ally have no problem (or at least not the same problem) with, say, the bed or the 
shuttle as instantiations, but we tend to complicate matters with tallness as an 
instantiation, wondering whether something abstract, such as tallness (as a qual-
ity), can be the instantiation of something else that is abstract, such as the Form 
of Tallness. We may thereby be making more of the tallness in something or of 
someone than is required to make sense of the instantiation of Forms. The tallness 
in Simmias is the tallness of Simmias.28
An even better distinction (or perhaps a better naming convention for the 
same distinction) may be between simple and complex instantiations — or be-
tween full and partial instantiations, or direct and indirect instantiations, or defin-
ing and refining ones. The simple kind is when the Form is instantiated precisely 
as what it is, the Form of Bed, as a bed, the Form of Justice, as justice, and so 
on. The complex kind is when the Form is instantiated, again, as what it is, but 
in something that is more than just the instantiation of the Form in question, as is 
the case with the instantiation of the Form of Tallness in Simmias. There is noth-
27  The reference to anamnēsis is merely a reminder of the underlying epistemology, which, 
of course, does not constitute a demonstration of anything regarding the metaphysics. Thesleff 
himself is not very interested in the matter, regarding it as a mythic thought experiment with 
little if any relevance to anything outside the eschatological epistemology of the philosopher 
following the gods toward a rather mystical enlightenment (Phaedrus 246e–249d). Noting 
that it never took on a more important function, he deems it "unfortunate" that the experiment 
"became a standard requisite of Platonism" (1999, 86 [= 2009, 468]).
28  I am not alone in this reading. Kahn, for one, finds it plausible: "The reference to 'the tallness 
in us' at Phaedo 102d7 was probably intended only as a linguistic variant for our being tall" 
(1996, 357, Stephanus notation modified). Allen makes a similar point about the instantiation 
of justice: "to say, for example, that there is justice in an action is merely another way, and an 
ordinary way, of saying that an action is just" (1970, 146).
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ing wrong with one kind that would not also be wrong with the other. Yet while 
we normally do not think to bring up the bedness of the bed as a complication, 
a puzzling category between the Form of Bed and the physical bed, we do this 
regularly with the tallness of Simmias, as if the latter represented an entirely dif-
ferent sort of instantiation.
There is actually just one sort of instantiation.29 We are not clear on how 
it works. Nor are we in agreement. But many of us would probably be willing to 
grant that, however it works, it works the same way in all cases. It may or may not 
be a tenable phenomenon or process, but the instantiation of Forms should pose 
no special problems, only a general one, if any at all.
Greater clarity may be had through a reconsideration of the proper corre-
spondence between the elements compared in the foregoing examples. Some of 
the comparisons seem to have been cast at the wrong level, resulting in the jux-
taposition of disparate elements. The analogic counterpart of the bedness of the 
bed is not the tallness in or of Simmias but tallness as a quality.30 It may help to 
think metaphorically of the Form of Tallness as somehow coming to be present in 
Simmias, but this is not the same as identifying a new (immanent) Form of Tall-
ness to be distinguished from the standard (transcendent) Form of Tallness. There 
is just the one Form (for Tallness as for anything else) and it is transcendent. Its 
instantiation is not the same as the Form itself.
This is not intended as a definitive answer, not, to be more specific, as a 
conclusive general account of instantiation, but as a possible explanation on be-
29  That said, the instantiation of Forms, and thereby the relationship between Forms and 
particulars, is explicated in various different ways, ranging from the 'participation' of the thing 
in the Form, to the opposite perspective in the 'inherence' of the Form in the thing, to an even 
vaguer 'communion' between the two. This is often associated with the question of causation 
or causal explanation in Plato, especially in its bearing on the Forms. See, e.g., Alican (2012, 
95–97); cf. Thesleff (2013, 28, n. 34). It is also the focal point of Thesleff's notion of 'bridges' 
between ontological levels. See the preceding notes on causation (n. 19) and bridges (n. 25). 
At any rate, the point of claiming that there is only one kind of instantiation is not to deny 
the variety of attempts to account for instantiation but to suggest that any model proposed to 
explain instantiation (whether or not that model works differently from any other) must work 
the same way when applied to the Form of Bed as it does when applied to the Form of Tallness 
(or to the Form of anything else).
30  The tallness of Tallness the Form is an altogether different problem, one receiving plenty 
of attention in the literature as the Third Man Argument. The question on hand is not whether 
the Form of Bed is a bed but whether the bedness of the bed constitutes a puzzle, a separate 
and unfathomable ontological category, in the relationship between the Form of Bed and the 
physical bed.
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half of Thesleff regarding his refusal to recognise immanent Forms.31 Whether 
or not the skeletal response sketched here is on the right track, it gives rise to 
an even more important question. In other words, even if the response contem-
plated above is correct in itself, and further, even if it captures Thesleff's actual 
thoughts on the matter, it brings us to a related but more fundamental matter re-
quiring clarification, again, concerning transcendence. In fact, this prior issue is 
not about transcendence alone but about the entire collection of features Thesleff 
attributes to Ideal Forms.32 The potential problem is that transcendence (and any 
other ontologically special feature) is accorded to Ideal Forms but not to the other 
two types except under special circumstances (through which the others come to 
resemble Ideal Forms). The next section explains why this may be a problem and 
examines whether it really is.
5. The Continuum of Abstraction
Thesleff's classification of Forms holds a certain potential for confusion in the de-
tails of the ontological stratification proposed. More accurately, the potential rests 
on just one detail that ties everything together: the provision for a gradation of 
reality not only between Forms and particulars but also between different kinds 
of Forms and further between Forms and mere abstractions. The difference be-
31  Thesleff does not take an active part in the debate on transcendence versus immanence. 
Neither his 'transcendence' nor his 'immanence' is much like what one might expect to find in 
the literature: "It is a specific characteristic of the entities of Plato's first ('higher') level to be, 
somehow, inherent (rather than 'immanent') in the corresponding entities of the second ('lower') 
level" (1999, 30 [= 2009, 414]). The key to understanding his noncommittal perspective is in 
his emphatic warning against making too much of the distinction: "It is again worth noting that 
there is no distinct gap of difference between the two levels in Plato's vision, no pointed χωρίς, 
no deep separation of the 'immanent' from the 'transcendent'" (1999, 63 [= 2009, 446]). His 
koinōnia, on the other hand, is no more demanding than his chōrismós. The balance, therefore, 
is steadier than would be required for a contradiction. This leaves Thesleff without much of 
an internal conflict, the absence of which also deprives him of a serious incentive to debate 
the matter. His tendency to remain outside the dialogue in the secondary literature can be 
confirmed in his latest work (2013, 16, cf. nn. 9, 12), where he is content to refer readers to 
the contributions of others (Fine 1984, 1986; Devereux 1994; Nails 2013), though he does 
show a personal interest in the relevant passages in the primary sources, for example, the 
complications in Plato (Parmenides) and the critique in Aristotle (Metaphysics 1,987a29–b35, 
13,1078b7–1079a4, 13,1086a30–b12).
32  See Thesleff (2013, 27); cf. n. 17 above.
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tween Forms and particulars is par for the course, a common feature, if there ever 
was one, in the literature on Plato. The difference(s) between types of Forms is 
Thesleff's own contribution, and everything there is clear enough (which, at this 
point, is to endorse just the clarity and not necessarily the veracity or validity). 
The potential for confusion rests in the difference between a Form and a mere 
abstraction.
A concept, for example, is different from a Conceptual Form, the concept 
being less real, the Form, more so, but we also find that a Conceptual Form dif-
fers from an Ideal Form in a comparable fashion and degree. We find, in other 
words, that a Conceptual Form is not transcendent or intelligible, and so on, ex-
cept when it approximates to Ideal Forms. But in what way, then, is a Conceptual 
Form superior to a mere concept? The answer, not just for Conceptual Forms but 
for all Forms, is that the Form has a metaphysical eminence manifested at least 
as objective reality and causal efficacy (features common to all Forms), whereas 
what it represents, be it a value, a concept, or a relation, does not.
The answer itself is not problematic, but the assignment of objective real-
ity and some sort of causal efficacy to all Forms, while reserving transcendence 
and intelligibility and other metaphysically privileged qualities for Ideal Forms, 
raises the further question of what kind of reality it is that is assigned to the other 
two types of Forms if not a reality that is transcendent and intelligible. What does 
it mean to say that Conceptual Forms and Relational Forms are objectively real? 
Just how real are they? We seem to be looking for a mode of existence corre-
sponding neither to the physical reality of ordinary things nor to the conventional 
reality of abstractions nor to the perfect reality of Ideal Forms. It is difficult to 
imagine any type of Platonic Form with an existence that does not come with 
transcendence and intelligibility and the host of other features associated with 
Ideal Forms.
Note that we cannot evade the difficulty by backtracking and admitting 
that Conceptual Forms and Relational Forms are, after all, transcendent and in-
telligible and so on, for to do so would be to deny ontological ascent. Either they 
attain those qualities through ontological ascent, or if they have them in the first 
place, then there is no room for ontological ascent. And if they attain those quali-
ties through ontological ascent, then they are not so special beforehand, not, in 
other words, far superior to concepts.
A tempting response is that ontological ascent is precisely what accounts 
for the difference between concepts and Conceptual Forms (or between relations 
and Relational Forms, or between ideas or ideals and Ideal Forms), such that 
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without it there is no difference between a concept and a Conceptual Form (or 
a relation and a Relational Form, or an idea or ideal and an Ideal Form). But 
Thesleff clearly assigns ontological ascent to Conceptual Forms and Relational 
Forms that approximate somehow to Ideal Forms, thereby specifying when and 
explaining how these other two types of Forms come to possess features normally 
reserved for Ideal Forms (2013, 29–33, 42, 43–44). The same process cannot then 
be invoked to show that these other two types of Forms always possess those fea-
tures (transcendence and intelligibility and so on).
This line of criticism may be a bit pedantic. Thesleff is not very demanding 
here. If we agree that Conceptual Forms and Relational Forms have legitimate 
claims to objective reality, which we might then flesh out as ontological inde-
pendence (at least of the mind and of particulars), and if we recognise in addition 
that these two types of Forms have cosmologically significant causal roles, the 
cumulative evidence, that is, the base of agreement, could arguably be sufficient, 
as suggested in section 4, to distinguish them from mere concepts and relations 
(and abstractions in general). Whether it is or not is indeed the central question 
— and the prime reason for the potential confusion regarding ontological ascent. 
As far as Thesleff is concerned, we do not even have to bother with the matter 
of causality, since we do not quite know what we would be getting into there. 
He is perfectly comfortable with objective reality (especially with full ontologi-
cal independence) as representing a minimally acceptable sense of metaphysical 
eminence clearly not shared by mere abstractions. But as long as we are revisiting 
the response to the 'glorified concepts' analogy entertained in section 4, a dis-
passionate assessment requires acknowledging that the metaphysical eminence 
claimed there for Conceptual Forms and Relational Forms, while establishing 
their superiority to concepts and such, leaves open the question whether they are 
nevertheless 'glorified concepts' — difficult to rule out, because the term does not 
really mean anything, and difficult to ignore, because we understand exactly what 
it means anyway.
The difficulties may stand exacerbated by complications associated with 
using a metalanguage (relative to Plato in translation) that is an integral part of 
our natural language but probably was not a part of Plato's — nor, evidently, of 
his audience. The difference, to fill in the details, is between talking about Forms 
with a shared understanding of concepts and talking about them without one.33 
33  This is intended not as a judgement from a position of expertise but as a naïve exploration 
of the possibilities. If the statement is vulnerably bald, safeguards are certainly welcome as 
amendments. Perhaps, for example, the difference invoked here is better explicated as one 
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This is a controversial assumption, but it is not entirely untenable, despite recent 
studies suggesting that the actual gap was not as great as one may think and im-
plying therefore that this way of putting it may be an exaggeration of the facts.34 
It is not, at any rate, an easy matter. The fact, for example, that Plato had a word 
(or two or three) for 'concept' does not settle the issue one way or the other.35 We 
know all too well how hard the Socrates of the so-called early dialogues has to 
work to get his interlocutors to understand the question whenever he inquires into 
the nature of what would now strike us as an ordinary concept.36 If everyone in 
Socratic Athens, or even just the philosophical community there, had been com-
fortable with abstraction, we would not have had Socratic interlocutors giving an 
example of virtue as an answer to what virtue is (Meno), pointing to an instance 
of piety in response to what piety is (Euthyphro), and so on with other familiar 
between talking about Forms while drawing on a shared understanding of concepts (or of the 
process of abstraction) and talking about Forms with no recourse to a fully established and 
sufficiently common background understanding of concepts (or of the process of abstraction).
34  The recent studies in question are those on Plato's understanding of concepts and on his 
notion of abstraction. Helmig (2004, 2007, 2012) is in the vanguard of ongoing research in 
this area. Schumacher (2010) is a good example of work drawing on Helmig. Warner (1965) 
and Gerson (1999a, 1999b) are forerunners worth consulting on the same topic. If it would 
not be too presumptuous to speak of a trend here, one of the safest generalisations that can be 
made is that there is a growing consensus that we have to make a greater effort to understand 
Plato's approach to abstraction, using all the resources available to us instead of confining the 
investigation to the letter of the text. Accordingly, the focus is oftentimes more on Platonism 
and the Platonic tradition than on Plato. We are encouraged to consult, say, the Middle Platonists 
or the Neoplatonists for clues on how to handle the gaps in Plato himself. The general lesson to 
be learnt there seems to be that a discussion of abstraction in Plato need not be restricted to the 
realm of Forms, which leaves room for an independent albeit related discussion of concepts.
35  Noting that ancient Greek had several words that can now be translated as 'concept' (though 
never claiming that any one of these refers precisely to what we typically take today to be 
concepts), Helmig (2012, 14–15) lists thirteen individual words and one pair of words, each 
and every one of them liable to be qualified by adjectives (also listed in full), which, in turn, 
can themselves be used as nouns. Among these, only ennoia is identified as already occurring 
in Plato, specifically at Phaedo 73c and Philebus 59d (Helmig 2012, 14, n. 6). This does not 
bring us, with reference to Plato, anywhere near a philosophy of concepts, or of abstraction, 
that can be distinguished from any philosophy of Forms (nor does Helmig claim that it does).
36  Even if this were nothing more than a dramatic ploy to create an occasion for demonstrating 
how abstraction works, and not otherwise an indication that characters who do not understand 
abstraction are representative of actual people who did not understand abstraction, we would 
still be left with the fact that there was some use, in fact, a philosophical need, for a dramatic 
ploy to create an occasion for demonstrating how abstraction works.
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examples in other memorable encounters. The existence of a word for some-
thing is not the same as a clear or common understanding of that thing — nor, 
therefore, indicative of the presence of intelligent dialogue on it — as confirmed 
by Plato's Socrates in reporting that he has yet to meet anyone who knows what 
virtue is (Meno 71c).
And the problem is not restricted to moral concepts. Any scenario where it 
is necessary, or even merely useful, to explain that 'Roundness' is not an adequate 
response to 'What is shape?' (Meno 73e, 74b), or that 'Whiteness' is not an ad-
equate response to 'What is colour?' (Meno 74c), suggests that something is miss-
ing in the prevailing conception of abstraction. This is precisely what we have 
in the character of Meno, who, even after this very explanation, is still reluctant 
to demonstrate that he has understood what is being asked, as he declines to say 
what it is that is common to roundness and straightness and other things we call 
'shape' (Meno 75a–b). The various clarifications and instructions do not prove to 
be enough; Socrates has to go on to supply the answer as well. This is evidence 
both that Plato understood abstraction and that not everyone did.
To elaborate, then, on the question of possible conceptual or linguistic dif-
ferences between Plato's circumstances and our own, the problem is not that Plato 
was not able to work with abstraction, or that he was ill-equipped to do so (which 
he probably was in terms of the philosophical parlance he inherited), but that he 
did not say enough about it to help us see exactly how he distinguished between 
concepts and Forms. We naturally use our own understanding of concepts to fig-
ure out what it is that Plato took to be Forms, as we are not able to use Plato's 
understanding of concepts toward that same end. We use terms like 'concept' or 
'universal' or 'abstraction' in our efforts to explore all possible shades of meaning 
between a Form and the thing of which it is a Form, but this may be a luxury or 
privilege, perhaps even an extravagance, that was not fully available to Plato. In 
the final analysis, Plato seems to have been at the forefront of a breakthrough in 
the conceptual, linguistic, and philosophical development of abstraction — thus 
engaged not in applying a familiar process but in inventing, exploring, or refining 
it — and we cannot sensibly expect from him the same discussion at the same 
level we are engaged in today.
This is not to say that Plato does not distinguish between Forms and con-
cepts. He clearly does (though he does not do so clearly). Otherwise, he would 
have had no occasion to convey a sense of hesitation regarding the assignment of 
Forms to man, fire, and water, while enthusiastically embracing Forms for jus-
tice, beauty, and goodness, and unequivocally rejecting them for hair, mud, and 
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dirt (Parmenides 130b–d). He has a tendency to draw or imply distinctions, these 
and yet others, which we can appreciate from our own perspective as a distinc-
tion between Forms and concepts.37 In fact, recent studies on the subject both de-
liver and recommend an examination of Plato's approach to abstraction in greater 
depth than the customary focus on Forms with little or no emphasis on concepts 
or concept formation.38 What we keep debating is not whether there is a differ-
ence between Forms and concepts but what that difference is. And the difference 
is at once so obvious and so nuanced that we have to be guarded in what we say, 
which means that we usually do not end up saying anything very interesting.39
Efforts to lay out Plato's understanding of abstraction, beyond, as intimated, 
what we have long been discussing in regard to the Forms, centre on anamnēsis.40 
No doubt, just the mention of anamnēsis brings to mind the age-old preoccupa-
tion with Forms. Yet the suggestion is not that we should focus our attention 
elsewhere but that we should dig deeper here. Possibly the most exciting devel-
opment in the relevant literature, for example, in Schumacher (2010) expanding 
on Helmig (2004), is the thesis that Platonic anamnēsis is not a matter of recol-
lecting this or that Form (or concept) but of recovering the intellectual capacity 
for abstraction. Another way of thinking about this would be as the activation of 
an innate faculty. Recollection, so the argument runs, is abstraction, particularly 
37  This brings up the question whether we might be reading our own perspective back into 
Plato, but this cannot be all that is going on, as it does not explain why not every concept or 
abstraction from our perspective is a Form from Plato's perspective. The selectivity in Plato is 
hard to miss, especially with Thesleff's approach, where there is a difference not just between 
Forms and concepts but also between different kinds of Forms.
38  The recent studies mentioned here are, again, those concerning Plato's understanding of 
concepts and abstraction, as documented in part in n. 34 above.
39  This is still better than not saying anything that is true. The truth is not too far to reach. 
It is just difficult to articulate. And this may be why we rarely end up saying anything more 
interesting than that Forms are not concepts. Here is one example: "Forms are rather the objective 
correlates of thought; they are not concepts or mental entities that are confined to human souls" 
(Helmig 2012, 50; cf. Helmig 2007, 306, for the same statement in almost exactly the same 
words). As unadventurous as this view may seem, its latest expression (Helmig 2012, 50, n. 43) 
is anchored, for good measure, to references to Cherniss (1944, 214–16, n. 128) and Lafrance 
(1984) in support of the hardly controversial claim that Forms are not concepts.
40  This is the 'doctrine' ('metaphor'?) of recollection introduced in the Meno (81a–86c), 
developed in the Phaedo (72e–77a), and invoked in the Phaedrus (249b–c). The separate 
occasions (Meno, Phaedo, Phaedrus) to utilise the 'doctrine' (or merely to mention it, as the 
case may be) present mutual inconsistencies, at least in appearance, often inspiring efforts 
toward reconciliation, as in Allen (1959) and Helmig (2004).
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in the sense that it taps into the hardwired ability to make generalisations. On this 
interpretation, anamnēsis is not so much a matter of recollecting specific Forms 
as it is of recollecting what to do with them, of how to use them to understand the 
world around us.41 This is not the empirical abstraction espoused by Aristotle42 
as an alternative to recollection but a rational abstraction through the recovery 
and projection of innate knowledge as a cognitive process as opposed to mental 
content.43
To return to the question of ontological ascent, any confusion regarding 
precisely where it belongs (and how it works) in Plato's metaphysics is a reflec-
tion or extension of uncertainties in the ongoing efforts of the scholarly commu-
nity to work out the details of Plato's understanding of abstraction. We are all still 
participants in a collective work in progress. It is, therefore, not easy to ascertain 
whether Plato envisaged two different types of transformation, one from concepts 
41  There is still something to be said for the recollection of individual Forms, an established 
reading which cannot profitably be dismissed offhand, even if the alternative broadens the 
interpretive possibilities. The evidence is mixed. The Meno (81a–86c) can be read as alluding 
to the recovery of the intellectual capacity for abstraction, or perhaps, more generally, to the 
activation of innate cognitive functions: Note the reference to discovering everything upon 
recalling one thing (81d). But the Phaedo (72e–77a) is replete with examples of specific Forms 
identified as objects of recollection: the equal (74a–75c); the greater and the smaller (75c); the 
beautiful, the good, the just, the pious, with a loose and generously inclusive reference to what 
seems like all other Forms (75d, cf. 76d, 77a). The Phaedrus can go either way: It points to 
abstraction where it presents recollection as a process whereby the soul (of the philosopher) in 
its cosmic journey (248a–249d) forges a reasoned unity out of its various perceptions (249b–c). 
But it quickly degenerates into the recollection of specific items as it brings up the 'sacred 
objects' seen before (250a). In this regard, the emphasis on beauty is both unmistakeable and 
unforgettable, especially as it is juxtaposed with justice and temperance, both of which are said 
to be more difficult to recognise in their earthly manifestations whereas beauty shines brightly 
(250b).
42  For Aristotle's reaction (and alternative) to Platonic anamnēsis, see Posterior Analytics 
2,99b15–100b17.
43  What is new or exciting here is not necessarily the interpretation of the object of recollection 
as a cognitive process as opposed to mental content. The novelty, rather, is in identifying that 
process specifically as abstraction. Otherwise, the process interpretation can be, and has been, 
cast in different terms. A good example, an alternative to the one on hand, is the approach 
of Allen (1959), who proposes that what is recollected is the power of inference, though he 
also retains the notion of the recollection of Forms: "The theory of Anamnesis is a theory of 
inference, and it rests on the intensional relations which the Forms bear to one another" (1959, 
167). Allen even anticipates, and rejects, the abstraction account, maintaining instead that 
knowledge of the Forms is epistemically (and, for Plato, also temporally) prior to knowledge 
of particulars (1959, 169).
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into Conceptual Forms (or from relations into Relational Forms, or from ideas or 
ideals into Ideal Forms), the other, from Conceptual Forms (or Relational Forms) 
into Ideal Forms.44 He indeed may have. Or he may not have. The details of 
Plato's ontology are not cut and dried. Nor are they amenable to direct inference 
from assumptions or conclusions about his epistemology. As Thesleff claims, for 
the basic difference between mere abstractions from our perspective and Forms 
from Plato's perspective, we do not have much to go by except the demonstrable 
importance, significance, or value Plato attached to any given abstraction.45 A 
value, concept, or relation has a Form corresponding to it if and only if it strikes 
Plato as being somehow important, significant, or special enough to have a Form 
corresponding to it. If we were to attempt to list all Platonic Forms, we would be 
safest in sticking close to the text of the dialogues. We could, of course, extrapo-
late from explicit examples that obviously recall others, but the further we get 
from the actual examples, the more likely we are to be expanding the platform 
rather than exploring it.
6. Conclusion
What did in fact impress Plato as important, significant, or special enough to have 
a Form corresponding to it is not as hazy a matter as this rather loose characteri-
sation may seem to suggest. On any sensible interpretation, the relative value in 
question would have to be anchored to explanatory power. Plato, like any other 
philosopher, was looking to understand the world in which he found himself. But 
unlike most philosophers, he seems to have had to create or develop the concep-
tual apparatus required to carry out what might otherwise have been a standard 
philosophical project.46 And his principal creation to facilitate his own effort is 
the interpretive paradigm of Forms. If that is true, then what impressed Plato as 
important turns out to be whatever helped explain the world. We already have 
some idea regarding the specifics, as we turn time and again to examples such 
44  This is a different question from whether or not Thesleff would be justified (in terms of the 
internal consistency of his own position) in attributing to Plato both types of ontological ascent.
45  See Thesleff (2013, 29–33, 44). Note especially the correlation between Conceptual Forms 
and "everything Plato found somehow real or important"; cf. also the assessment that "anything 
Plato could and wanted to conceptualise ended up as a Conceptual Form" (31).
46  There is some truth, after all, to Whitehead's long overworked estimation of Plato's position 
in the European intellectual tradition.
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as justice and beauty. But if any generalisation were possible, this would be it 
— that the Forms help do philosophy (or that they helped Plato do it). It is this 
simple principle that is at the heart of Thesleff's approach, guiding him both in 
differentiating between Forms and concepts and in formulating a classification of 
Forms.
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